**Vigilante Justice Persists Amid the Enforcement of Indonesian Anti-Blasphemy Law's Failure to Preserve Justice.**

**Cekli Setya Pratiwi**

Institute of Human Rights and Peace Studies at Mahidol University,   
Faculty of Law, University of Muhammadiyah Malang

[ceklisetya.pra@student.mahidol.edu](mailto:ceklisetya.pra@student.mahidol.edu) or [cekli@umm.ac.id](mailto:cekli@umm.ac.id);

**ABSTRACT**

In previous studies on vigilantes who target common criminals, the corruption of law enforcement officials has frequently been cited as a factor that allows offenders to avoid punishment based on their feelings rather than facts supported by evidence. In instances of blasphemy in various nations, reactive religious violence results from inadequate protection of religious values against transgressions, regardless of religious affiliation. According to a separate study, in Indonesia, vigilante justice has shifted from spontaneous action to more structured and even state-sponsored action through the state's discriminatory anti-blasphemy law. Using a socio-legal approach, this study aims to apprehend the factors and actors that encourage vigilantism over purported blasphemy, assess their impact on the independence of the judiciary in deciding blasphemy cases, and evaluate the failure of the courts to uphold justice. This study adds to the findings of previous research, which determined that vigilante justice in blasphemy cases in Indonesia typically occurs before and after a court decision. Using strategies of hate-spinning, vigilante organizations portray themselves as victims of hatred and shaped by various factors, including the existence of a nebulous blasphemy law encourages authorities to legitimize vigilante justice against blasphemy offenders. These factors influence the court's decision-making in blasphemy cases, thereby undermining its independence.

**Keywords: vigilante justice, anti-blasphemy law enforcement, Indonesia, human rights, social justice.**

**ABOUT THE SPEAKER**

Cekli Setya Pratiwi is an Associate Professor at the Law Faculty of Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang (UMM) who is actively engaged in human rights and peace studies as a PhD candidate. She is a distinguished tutor of a human rights program on standard and mechanisms at the IHRP Mahidol University. Pratiwi holds a Master's degree in Comparative Law from J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University (2019) and an LLM degree in International and European Protection of Human Rights from School of Law, Utrecht University (2006). Her research work on law, religious law, and human rights law is widely acclaimed and a few examples of her publications include peer-reviewed articles such as Blasphemy Law as Structural Violence (Muslim World Journal of Human Rights, 2020), Rethinking the Constitutionality of Anti-Blasphemy Law (Constitutional Review, 2021), and Indonesia's Legal Policies amidst Covid-19: Balancing Public Health and Religious Freedom (Journal of Southeast Asian Human Rights Journal, 2022). Since 2011, she has taught the Master Course on Shariah and Human Rights organized by UMM, the ICLRS, and the Norwegian Center for Human Rights. She is the editor-in-chief of Shari'a and Human Rights: A Coursebook (Mizan Publisher, 2022) in two languages and the main author of A Study of the Second Amendment of the Bill of Information and Electronic Transaction in Indonesia Relevancy to the Right of Freedom of Expression (*KOMNAS-HAM*, 2022). In 2023, *KOMNAS-HAM* recommends Pratiwi to create a state institution human rights compliance audit guideline.

**INTRODUCTION**

Indonesia is among the few countries that still uphold anti-blasphemy laws, despite commonly recognized allegations of infringement upon freedom of religion and expression in modern democratic nations leading to their repeal. Scholars argue that the Indonesia’s Anti- Blasphemy is flawed due to ambiguity in content (Bielefeldt, 2012; Marshall, 2018; Menchik, 2014). In addition, recent research from Pratiwi (2021) contends that the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia disregarded the principle of non-discrimination in the right to freedom of religion, thereby rejecting a request for a judicial review to annul the law out of concern for the potential for conflict between different religious communities in the event of a legal vacuum. However, the legal philosophy of Constitutional Court does not reflect actuality. Despite efforts to enforce the Law Against Blasphemy of Religion, vigilante attacks on religious minorities accused of heresy persisted.

Numerous blasphemy cases in Indonesia show that not only were the accused all subjected to violent or physical attacks at their places of worship, but the courts also handed down some very harsh sentences. The Setara Institute found that between 1965 and 2017, 42 of the 97 blasphemy cases involved vigilante groups. Out of the total cases, 76 were resolved through "pro-justicia," with 47 cases receiving jail sentences ranging from one to 4.5 years, five receiving over 4.5 years, and eight receiving less than a year in prison (Nalle, 2017).

Previous studies on vigilante justice against offenders of common offenses were frequently influenced by corruption among law enforcement officials, resulting in offenders escaping legal consequences. People who take the law into their own hands based on emotions rather than evidence-based facts (Scheuerman, 2022). Hassner (2011) determined, in the case of blasphemy, that reactive religious violence results from inadequate protection of religious values against transgressive acts, irrespective of religious affiliation. However, in cases of blasphemy, vigilante justice has shifted from spontaneous action to more structured and even state-sponsored actions. Pratiwi & Sunaryo (2021) argues that vigilante violence surrounding accusations of blasphemy in countries like Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia cannot be separated from structural violence created by the states through discriminatory anti-blasphemy laws.

This study has significant findings that complement previous study regarding the occurrence of vigilante justice over blasphemy allegations, its impact on judicial independence in deciding blasphemy cases, and why anti-blasphemy laws have failed to preserve justice. This study determined that vigilante justice existed before court decisions and recurred after court rulings were issued. Different vigilante organizations use hate-spinning strategies to portray themselves as victims of hatred. Existence of a vague blasphemy law encourages those in positions of authority to issue public policies to give more protection to majority religious groups, which the court cannot ignore when determining blasphemy cases, thereby undermining the court's independence to administer justice.

**RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

Numerous studies have analysed the Anti-Blasphemy Law in Indonesia, primarily focusing on normative evaluations of the law's substance and its non-conformity with international human rights standards (Bielefeldt, 2012; Pratiwi, 2021). Other studies have examined public perceptions of the law through empirical legal analysis utilizing a socio-legal approach to explore the gap between ideal legal norms and the reality of law's implementation in society (Banakar, 2019; Bedner & Vel, 2010). This study has gathered a wide array of data, including case studies, statutory analysis, and in-depth interviews with experts, judges, religious followers, members of religious groups, and minority religious groups.

The research has looked into at least four cases, with the first being the case of Ahok, a Cristian Chinese Governor of Jakarta who were found guilty of blasphemy after criticized the politization of QS. Al-Maida verse 51 to gain Muslims supports on election. The second is Meiliana case, a Buddhist woman from Medan who criticized the loudness of the adhan call to prayer, exemplifying how the enforcement of blasphemy laws has often resulted in intolerance and discrimination against religious minorities. She was subjected to hateful incitement, accused of blasphemy against Islam, leading to the burning and damaging of several Buddhist temples in her area, despite undergoing trial, which resulted in a sentence of 1 year and 8 months. The third and fourth cases are the experiences of the Ahmadiyya and Gafatar groups, highlighting the dangers of vigilantism in response to blasphemy law enforcement. Thus, it is crucial to re-evaluate the role of the law, ensuring that its enforcement upholds human rights principles and promotes religious tolerance, while sternly condemning acts of vigilantism aimed at harming minorities in Indonesia.

Subsequently, the collected data is assessed, selected, and inventoried to address the research questions. A critical legal study approach is utilized to derive conclusions from the analysed data. By evaluating the gap between the theoretical and practical implementation of the law, the anticipated outcomes of this research are expected to answer the research questions mentioned earlier and may provide recommendations that promote the preservation of human rights and social justice in Indonesia.

**LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK**

The Anti-Blasphemy Law is a remnant of the old order that has been maintained until today (Temperman & Koltay, 2017). Several studies have indicated that the law has two main weaknesses. The first weakness is that the law no longer aligns with human rights law development (Bush, 2015; Fischer, 2021; Telle, 2017). The law prohibits individuals who hold beliefs or teachings that differ from officially recognized religions in Indonesia. Consequently, minority religious teachings can be deemed heretical, and freedom of religion or belief can be violated. The second weakness is that the law contains normative provisions that are ambiguous and open to interpretation. When enforced, subjectivity in interpretation could lead to discrimination against religious minority groups. If used as the basis for court rulings, it could result in discriminatory decisions against minority religious groups.

Research conducted by George Cherian (2017) indicates that hate spin is a contributing factor that supports the enforcement of the blasphemy law. According to Cherian, hate spin has become an instrument of political campaigning, planned as a sophisticated instrument designed to paralyse political opponents through identity concerns. Cherian elaborates that hate spin tactics involve "manufactured vilification or anger employed as a political technique". This tactic of hate spin is disseminated in a way that opportunistic or hardliner groups exploit sentiments of the dominant religious group to seek extensive support, aided by online communication mediums that travel swiftly and unfiltered.

Fischer (2021) stated that out of the 164 observations of anti-blasphemy law enforcement in different countries in 2020, 76 of them were accompanied by mass mobilization activities, threats of violence, and actual violence. Vigilante justice, also known as *Main Hakim Sendiri* in Indonesia, is is typically described as the act of trying to convict an accused individual without proper legal proceedings or taking justice into one's own hands. It is generally considered illegal and occurs spontaneously as a result of public anger over criminal offenses or immoral behaviour that is caught red-handed. Alternatively, *Main Hakim Sendiri* can also be seen as arbitrary acts of power or without the consent of the affected parties, as per Manan's interpretation (Manan, 2013). In essence, *Main Hakim Sendiri* characterizes the execution of sanctions by individuals. Additionally, Indonesia is currently experiencing an increasing trend of religious intolerance (Sebastian & Arifianto, 2020).

This study departs from the theories of the rule of law and justice that are essential for creating fair and equitable societies (Bellamy, 2017; Merkel, 2012). Justice and the rule of law are closely related. Fair and equitable society require both (Kramer, 2017; Merkel, 2013). The rule of law applies to everyone, regardless of socioeconomic class (Baxi, 2013). However, justice guides the rule of law. Justice seeks to create a fair and just society where everyone has equal rights and opportunities. Thus, the rule of law must promote fairness and ensure equal access to justice (Baxi, 2013; Zaidi, 2021). Without the rule of law, justice is impossible since an unequal judicial system would violate people's right to justice (Boer, 2020). The rule of law must ensure that the legal system does not favor the wealthy. This might include giving legal help to people who cannot afford it (Boer, 2020) or writing rules and regulations in a way that does not oppress underprivileged groups (Zaidi, 2021).

The presence of clear and unambiguous laws is essential for judges to qualify someone's behaviour as wrong (Beckett et al., 2018). On the other hand, ambiguous laws can make it difficult for the court to qualify whether someone's behaviour is prohibited. Ambiguous laws can cause the court to subjectively interpret criminal behaviour. In such a context, judges can easily be influenced by external factors (Malle & Nelson, 2003). This study will therefore provide substantial insight into the role of the rule of law and justice in elucidating the phenomenon of vigilante justice against those accused of blasphemy and the extent to which this impacts law enforcement on blasphemy cases in court in order to achieve justice.

The court serves as the final option for those seeking justice. Therefore, it is crucial that the court acts professionally in enforcing the law and treats every individual equally. A person suspected of a crime must be considered innocent until proven guilty by the judge. Therefore, every defendant has the right to defend themselves and present evidence that could prove their innocence. In cases of criminal offenses, the element of intention is vital; a person must be acquitted of any suspicion in the absence of intent. Having said that, in practice, the determination of blasphemy actions is ultimately based on various considerations by judges and factors outside of the court.

**RESULT, DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS**

**Perpetuation of vigilante justice against blasphemers influenced by the hate spin strategy**

In the midst of enforcing the Anti-Blasphemy Law, vigilante justice against religious minorities accused of blasphemy persists in Indonesia. This phenomenon undermines the Constitutional Court's argument that defending the Law Against Blasphemy of Religion can prevent horizontal conflicts between religions. Referring to the hate spin theory proposed by Josh Cherian, the increase of vigilantism is influenced by the hate spin strategy carried out by hardcore Islamic groups, where perpetrators carry out their actions after being motivated by hateful speeches from influential figures within their group, while the victims come from minority groups (George, 2017). One prominent minority group that has experienced acts of vigilantism is Ahmadiyya, which is a legally recognized entity in Indonesia established by the Indonesian Islamic Community and approved by the Ministry of Law in 1953. In 2017, a new case emerged in which five members of the Fajar Nusantara Movement (the Gafatar) were accused of using their organization to promote the heretical teachings of the teachings of *Millah Abraham* and were subsequently criminalized.

According to SETARA Institute's records, persecution against minorities in Indonesia takes various forms. One of the most frequent occurrences is the disturbance of places of worship. Such disturbances include the rejection of building a place of worship, disruptions during the construction of a place of worship, sealing off places of worship, disruptions during worship at places of worship, destruction of places of worship, and attacks on individuals in places of worship/places of worship carried out by non-state and/or state actors (SETARA Institute, 2022). Table 1 indicates the number of incidents of disturbances to interfaith harmony in Indonesia.

Table 1. Incidents Related to the Interreligious Harmony in Indonesia[[1]](#footnote-1)

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Year | Number of Incidents |
| 2017 | 17 |
| 2018 | 20 |
| 2019 | 31 |
| 2020 | 24 |
| 2021 | 44 |
| 2022 (Jan-Sep) | 32 |

Source:(SETARA Institute, 2022)

This study indicates that vigilante justice was perpetuated and occurred repeatedly in the four cases examined, as shown in Table 2. As seen by the incidents above, society might misread legal standards' ambiguity. Criticism of Islamic teachings (the Ahok case), criticism of Muslim religious practices (the Meiliana case), or belief in and propagation of teachings that are different from orthodox Islamic teachings (the Ahmadiyya and the Gafatar cases) runs the risk of being accused of "tarnishing Islam". Ministerial circulars, governor's regulations, and regional regulations support this interpretation. Social media continues to fabricate slander and accusations of the "true" teachings of Islam to elicit support and outrage.

The Hardliner Islamic groups, such as the Front Islamic Defender organized enormous protests to demand justice, which often leads to vigilante punishment. Ahok and Meiliana were convicted for Islam-related charges because hatred was organized. The politicization of religion, through blasphemy laws, has led to the prosecution of political opponents in Indonesia, as seen in Ahok and Meiliana's cases (Mulyartono et al., 2021). Indonesia's politics of religion exacerbates this issue because the majority, generally the Islamic community, may decide elections. Ahok's words were edited to incite hatred and denigrate Islam. To protect individuals' rights and well-being, laws must be upheld and not used for political purposes. While the Ahmadiyya and Gafatar instances were also considered deviations from "true" Islam and violations of Islamic law. Propaganda and vigilante action against these groups resulted from this enmity.

Table 2. Vigilante Justice and Hate Spin

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Cases*** | ***Vigilante Justice*** | ***Hate Spin Strategy Against Victims*** |
| ***Ahok Case*** | Ahok's statement that referenced QS. Al-Maida verse 51 regarding non-Muslim leaders to his constituents in the Thousand Islands triggered vigilante justice as Islamic groups staged mob protests, including *the Aksi 212* and *the Aksi 414.* *The Aksi Bela Islam 55* also marched to persuade the Constitutional Court to reject Ahok's judicial review of the anti-blasphemy bill. | The hate spin strategy was employed to frame the Ahok protest movement as defending Islam, implying that Ahok had attacked Islam and justifying the protests as retaliation for his supposed hatred of the religion. Ahok's critique of using QS. Al-Maida verse 51 to oppose non-Muslim candidates was seen as a disgrace to Islam. Budi Yani incited hate by editing a video of Ahok and adding a narrative that falsely accused him of disrespecting Islam. |
| ***Meiliana Case*** | The Meiliana case exposes Indonesian vigilantism against Buddhist religious minorities. Meiliana was sentenced to one year and eight months in jail for insulting Islam after complaining to her neighbour about the excessively loud call of pray (*adzan).* During the trial, vigilantes burnt many Buddhist temples, damaged Meiliana's home, and forced her to leave. | The case of Meiliana began with her complaint to a neighbor about the unusually loud volume of the mosque's call to prayer. However, as the information spread through social media, it was distorted to portray Meiliana, a Chinese-Indonesian Buddhist woman, as rejecting the call of pray in Islam. This shift in information represents a form of hate spin, with unclear origins, that quickly spread due to the presence of anti-Islamic sentiment |
| ***Gafatar Case*** | Moton Panjang and Tanjung Pasir villages in Kalimantan opposed Gafatar, a legal body founded in 2012 with 55,000 members, leading to serious repercussions for its supporters. Despite initial clearance from the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Gafatar was liquidated in 2015. The Human Rights Watch reported that 2,422 families (7,916 people) were forcibly expelled from Kalimantan within two months, and over 6,000 the Gafatar members were detained in illegal detention centers across Indonesia. The former of Gafatar chairman, Mahful M Tumanurung, expressed regret over the forced evictions, property damage, and asset looting against the Gafatar members. | The hate spin strategy against the Gafatar has had adverse effects on its followers, who have suffered from acts of vigilantism resulting in displacement, property damage, and severe injuries. The declaration of the Gafatar as a heretical movement has placed undue burden and harm to its members. |
| ***Ahmadiyya Case*** | Since 1980, the Indonesia's Ahmadiyya community has faced vigilante justice. The Ahmadiyya followers in Lombok, West Nusa Tenggara, Tangerang, Bogor, and East Java have been violently attacked, resulting in damage to their houses of worship and buildings, minor and severe injuries, deaths, and displacement. The Indonesian government must avoid such violence and promote religious tolerance and understanding. | The hate spin strategy has been used against the Ahmadiyya community, which is considered heretical by the MUI due to their belief in Mirza Gulam Ahmad as the last prophet and having a sacred book other than the Qur'an. This fundamental difference has led to tensions and vigilante justice against the Ahmadiyya followers. Despite their religious practices being similar to mainstream Islam, they are rejected by Pakistan, Malaysia, and OIC countries. The MUI's advice for the Ahmadiyya adherents to renounce Islam has not resolved the issue, as they continue to follow Islamic precepts. |

Human rights defenders, such as the YLBHI, worry about social media disinformation and fact-bending. Thus, citizens must be taught to respect religious pluralism and the law. To avoid misinterpretation, the government must also clarify what constitutes blasphemy. Interfaith discourse and respect for other religions may also promote tolerance and inclusion. The distortion of facts and the spread of misinformation through social media and other channels are serious concerns in Indonesia. The fact is that there is no education for citizens about the importance of respecting religious diversity and the rule of law. The government has also taken a position defending the anti-blasphemy law, which contains ambiguous legal norms, and then strengthening it by issuing various policies declaring various cases of blasphemy a form of insulting Islam or a deviant sect. Instead of opening up interreligious dialogue to mutually respect different religious beliefs, various policies actually provide legitimacy that encourages people to be intolerant of differences and exclusive.

**Factors and Actors Influence the Act of *Vigilante Justice over Blasphemy Allegations***

The issue of vigilante justice against religious minority groups in Indonesia is a concerning problem that has been influenced by various factors and actors as describe in figure 1.

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Figure 1. Factors and actors influence the act of Vigilante Justice

Firs of all, the legal factor shaped vigilante justice through the prolong existence of the flawed Indonesia’s Anti-Blasphemy Law has been manipulated by the Hardliner Islamic groups to promote war against blasphemy. The close connections between state officials and vigilante groups have significantly influenced the Indonesian state's response to violence against the Ahmadiyya and the Gafatar minority communities. As study done by Hewson, the connection has allowed vigilante groups to commit violent acts against minority congregations with a degree of impunity (Hewson, 2017). Ahok's case was initiated by a report from the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) of South Sumatra by Habib Novel Chaidir Hasan to the Criminal Investigation Agency (Bareskrim) LP/1010/x/2016, under charges of violating Article 156a of the Criminal Code in conjunction with Article 28 paragraph (2) of Law Number 11 2008 concerning Electronic Transaction Information. This was followed by a report from the Muhammadiyah Youth[[2]](#footnote-2) under report number TBL/4846/X/2016/PMJ/Dit Reskrimum.2016/PMJ/Directorate of Crime. In the Ahmadiyya’s case, the Ahmadiyya is a legal entity founded by the Indonesian Islamic Community approved by the Ministry of Law in 1953. However, since 1980 Ahmadiyya has been declared heretical by the Indonesian Council of Ulema, following several fatwas. the Indonesian government's pressure against Gafatar continued. On January 14, the Minister of Home Affairs instructed the local government to close all Gafatar offices. On March 24, Attorney General Muhammad Prasetyo announced a Joint Decree (SKB) warning that "former members and administrators of Gafatar" involved in "dissemination, interpretation, and activities that deviate from the main teachings of Islam" may face up to five years in prison, based on the 1965 blasphemy crime article.

Second, the ideology factor indicate that The ideology of Godly Nationalism in Indonesia contributes to prolonged enforcement of the Anti-Blasphemy Law by creating a law enforcement system that glorifies vigilante acts. Scholars suggest that Godly Nationalism results in religious intolerance and upholds religious values that are seen as contrary to blasphemy (Menchik, 2014; Telle, 2017). Indonesia's political climate further reinforces the rising trend of law enforcement against blasphemy, aiming to protect orthodox religions from deviant teachings and intolerant actions. The Constitutional Court reaffirms Godly Nationalism as embodied in Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution. However, this ideology also leads to the justification of vigilante acts against those accused of deviating from orthodox teachings, causing religious intolerance and promoting mob violence.

Thirdly, structural factor means that various state institutions interference religious life of the people through releasing various policies of deviant religions against Ahok, Meliana, the Ahmadiyya and the Gafatar. The Indonesian state's reluctance to assist or permit minority groups to practice their faith freely but instead strongly accommodate Majority groups' demand for religious issues has contributed to the prevalence of vigilante violence against religious minorities.

Fourth, blasphemy lawsuits are used by radical Islamic groups to win public support as Islamism rises. Although Ahmadiyya followers and other Muslim minority groups destroy most mosques that violate interfaith cooperation, Islamist populism has a role (Suryana, 2019). Thus, populism of Islam refers to Indonesia's majority Islam. Barton et al. (2021) found that the Front Defender of Islam (FPI), led by Rizieq Shihab (RS), is a vigilante Islamic group. Hate narratives are used to alienate outsiders, particularly politicians and the government, and push followers to vigilantly oppose all actions that violate Islamic ideals. RS has exploited his prominence to influence FPI in several anti-Ahok rallies, accused of degrading Islam, under the guise of protecting Islam, and FPI regularly joins Main Hakim Sendiri in blasphemy cases.

Ultimately, self-declared "justice" undermines Indonesia's rule of law and democracy. To promote tolerance and individual rights, strong legislative frameworks and their execution are necessary. Allowing extreme Islamic organizations to break the law in the name of religion will destroy Indonesia's national character and democracy.

**Vigilante Justice Upsetting Independency of the Court to preserve justice**

This incident illustrates that vigilante actions against religious minority groups cannot be justified and have grave consequences for the targeted individuals and communities. Upholding the principle of the rule of law is critical in combating such vigilantism and protecting the rights and well-being of citizens of different religious affiliations. Defending the Anti-Blasphemy Law does not guarantee an increase in interfaith tolerance, but rather provides an opportunity for the majority religious groups to utilize the flawed law in order to gain more protection than other minority religious groups.

Before the trial, many government entities through public policy had proclaimed all the defendants guilty of insulting Islam or heresy, threatening the court's independence. Courts violate due process, undercut the evidence process, and follow public policies to convict prisoners.

The court's independence was undermined in Meiliana's case due to the lack of thorough investigation and reliance on biased testimony. Meiliana's categorization as a suspect was a result of MUI's demands, influencing the court's decision making. Meiliana, Ahmadiyya, and Gafatar leaders were condemned to criminal punishment without due process, hence the court's ruling failed to give justice. The court's failure to prove the defendants' "intention" to blaspheme Islam shows that it overlooked the Anti-Blasphemy Law's significant flaws and compelled judgment based on social justice. The court failed to give justice by convicting the defendants using a defective legislation. In Meiliana, the court failed to give procedural justice since the defendants' guilt was not proven. The Panel of Judges exclusively followed the Fatwa of the MUI (Council of Muslim Scholars) of North Sumatra Province No. 001/KF/MUI-SU/I/2017, ignoring several expert testimony. MUI Fatwas are not legal in Indonesia. The MUI Fatwa was based on "Request for MUI Fatwa relating to blasphemy committed by Chinese ethnicity named Meliana." The Medan District Court ruled based on this MUI Fatwa. Some called Meliana a "woman who incited the riot."

The Ahmadiyya and Gafatar prosecutions also relied on vigilantism and reinforced the MUI's one-sided truth assertions. Mahful Muis and Ahmad Musaddeq's court ruling was also questioned for lacking evidence to support the prosecutor's claim. Legal rights and the rule of law prohibit vigilantism and protect religious minorities. Both the court of first instance and the high court ruled in the Ahmadiyya case that blasphemy against a religion other than Indonesia's is illegal. The court targeted Ahmadiyya members who "intentionally commit an act publicly that is basically blasphemy against a religion adhered to in Indonesia." If their faith violates mainstream Islam, Ahmadiyya adherents cannot preach in Indonesia.

The 1964 Supreme Court Circular Letter Number 11 directed courts within its authority to harshly punish blasphemers. Judges maintain the Anti-Blasphemy Law notwithstanding its flaws. The Supreme Court's Circular Letter must be followed, according to Gafatar Trial Panel Chair Mohammad Said. The Supreme Court spokeswoman also said the letter was never cancelled.

In comparable blasphemy instances, law enforcement will certainly fail to provide procedural and substantive justice.

**CONCLUSION**

Vigilantism in cases of blasphemy is not solely motivated by crime in society, but by the monopoly of religious truth by established religions, which views different religious teachings as crimes. The Indonesian Constitution guarantees freedom of religion and belief, but "Godly Nationalism" is too restricted.

The Indonesian Ulama Council or religious authorities from the majority group's fatwas labeling suspected as deviant, desecrating, or insulting Islam legitimize this injustice. The vigilantes use hate speech and fake news to manipulate social situations and put pressure on law enforcement and courts to speed up the legal process and violate minority religious groups' rights with the support of city, regency, and province policymakers.

The analysis disproves the Constitutional Court's claim that eliminating the Anti-Blasphemy Law will threaten society in the case of horizontal religious disputes. However, Ahok, Meiliana, Gafatar, and Ahmadiyya all lead to vigilante retribution. Maintaining a faulty Anti-Blasphemy Law allows hard-line Islamic groups to engage in hate mongering and prevents the courts from rendering fair and reasonable judgments.

The hate spin tactic can be used to interpret the defective anti-blasphemy laws to make criticism of religious manipulation, intolerance, or preaching of various religions blasphemous against Indonesia's main religions. This tactic has gained acceptance, legitimizing vigilante justice before trial. Second, structural forces, such as the MUI and national and regional governments that favor heterodox faiths, legitimize vigilante groups to keep up pressure. Thirdly, the monopolization of truth by orthodox religions denies minority religions the right to freely practice their religion under Article 29 of the Indonesian Constitution. Hardliner Muslim populism Islam is popular.

To prevent minority groups' religious freedom from being violated, policymakers and law enforcers must examine the Anti-Blasphemy Law's shortcomings and stop implementing it. Social justice and a legislation that upholds the rule of law and human rights are essential. This research urges Indonesia to reconsider its Anti-Blasphemy Law to defend human rights and achieve social fairness. The report urges law enforcement to reconsider its limits and difficulties in religious intolerance by identifying the numerous elements that promote vigilante justice. The study's findings may help Indonesian lawmakers enhance fairness and justice.

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1. However, it is important to emphasize that the majority of mosques targeted for disruption are Ahmadiyya mosques and other mosques that differ from the mainstream Muslim groups. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. See Kompas.com. Ahok Dilaporkan Dua Organisasi ke Polda Metro Jaya. October 7th, 2016. 19:20 WIB. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)